Contentious politics: financial crisis, political-economic conflict, and collective struggles - a commentary by Mew, Sue
Contentious Politics 99
 Social Justice Vol. 39, No. 1 99
Contentious Politics: Financial Crisis, 
Political-Economic Conflict, and 
Collective Struggles—A Commentary
Sue Mew*
Each of thE articlEs in this spEcial issuE of Social JuStice offErs a rich, exciting, and timely focus on various collective struggles and conflicts within the global crisis. At the heart of the current global 
crisis is a crisis of capitalism and in particular neoliberal financial and 
economic policy. Within the crisis of capitalism, we are also witnessing a 
political crisis—of representation, of legitimation, of defunct or dysfunc-
tional political processes and regimes—and a rejection of the “business as 
usual” status quo. This is as evident in Greece, Spain, Italy, and the UK as 
it is in Egypt—all countries featured in the articles here.
Above all, each article reveals that the global crisis in all its localized 
manifestations embraces a deepening social crisis that is wrought by loss 
of homes, falling incomes, unemployment, cuts to welfare provision, rising 
taxation, and increased food and energy costs. For many, these are the very 
basic needs for social reproduction—a point taken up by Brown et al. (2013) 
in this issue. They are the human costs of the economic and financial crisis, 
the living “collateral damage” of the global crisis.1
A brief commentary precludes a detailed discussion of all the excellent 
insights provided in the different articles. Instead, I will select some common 
thematic issues, such as dimensions of global crisis and related conflicts, 
the attack on social welfare and democracy, and the contentious forms of 
politics associated with a “politics from below” and the various collective 
struggles that have occurred in response to the crisis since 2008. Although 
each author uniquely addresses the issues with a particular emphasis, each 
theme recurs in different ways throughout the articles.
As I write, the daily news is a reminder that events in many of the 
countries under discussion remain mercurial and there will likely be further 
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widespread anger, protest, and instability in the future. Egypt and Greece 
are examples, as are Tunisia and Syria. The mercurial nature of current 
events is highlighted in some of the following examples.
A court in Egypt has ordered a retrial for ex-president Hosni Mubarak 
after accepting an appeal against his life sentence over failing to prevent the 
death of many hundreds of protestors during the 2011 uprising (BBC Online 
2013).2 And in the UK, the Conservative coalition government recently 
announced a 1 percent cap on welfare benefits over the next three years.3 
This represents a real-terms cut in benefits for the unemployed and many 
working families over this period, since the 1 percent benefits cap is lower 
than the current rate of inflation (see Peachey 2013). In November 2012 
the Greek Parliament agreed to a further round of austerity cuts, linked to 
the European “troika”4 and further bailout conditions. Only a day after the 
budget was approved, the troika demanded an additional 17.4 billion euros 
($22.6 billion) in cuts (Dreier 2012). In Italy, the technocratic president, 
Mario Monti, has stepped down and Silvio Berlusconi is shaping up for 
a return to office in the forthcoming election amid growing concerns that 
economic liberalization and austerity cuts in Italy have not achieved any 
real depth in relation to reducing the debt—e.g., relative to GNP, levels 
of unemployment, or industrial production (Pratley 2012). The situation 
is similar in Spain, where the recession is reportedly much deeper, the 
unemployment rate is more severe, and banks are more dysfunctional (ibid.).
All such developments suggest that during 2013 and beyond there will be 
a growing body of evidence of social inequalities and poverty, rising levels 
of unemployment, lower than expected economic growth, and a sharpening 
divide between the state and society more generally.
The Crisis of Capitalism and Financialization
At the heart of these developments stands the crisis of capitalism and 
neoliberalism. Financial and economic neoliberal policies are associated with 
the deregulation of banks, finance, and markets. Each factor is associated 
with the origins of the global financial crisis that followed the bankruptcy 
of the investment bank Lehman Brothers on September 15, 20085 and the 
liquidity crisis suffered by AIG (American International Group, Inc.), the 
multinational insurance corporation, when its credit ratings were downgraded 
below AA levels in the same month.6
The subsequent conversion of privately generated debt into sovereign 
debt to keep a rogue global industry afloat severely undermined public trust 
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in the ability of economic and political elites and governments to regulate 
the unbridled interests of global financial capitalism or to effectively 
“manage” the crisis in a socially just and accountable way. This is hardly 
surprising, given that the history of capitalism is, as Kouvelakis (2012, 
xiv) acknowledges, the history of crises. When confronted with its own 
contradictions, the capitalist mode of production has no alternative but to 
reinvent itself, always at considerable cost, and thus new contradictions and 
reconfigurations occur within the same fundamental “structural coordinates,” 
thus leading to further crises (ibid., xiv).
The sovereign debt crisis—the crisis of national public debt—is best 
understood as a crisis of the financialization of capitalism.7 Underway for at 
least the past three decades, this process has resulted in the growing weight 
of finance relative to production (see Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 1). However, 
the immediate roots of the current public debt crisis lie in the financial 
upheaval of 2007–2009, which was created by speculative mortgage lending 
by US financial organizations and the trading of derivative securities by 
international banks (ibid.). This produced a large “bubble” during the first 
decade of the new century, resulting in the global crisis and recession that 
many countries are now experiencing. As Lapavitsas et al. (2012, 2) explain, 
financialization has unfolded in different ways across countries, including 
those within the European Union.8
That is the context for all of the articles here, not least because the 
financial, economic, and social policies of the power elite—economic and 
political—have continued to disproportionately benefit these two groups 
since at least the 1970s. The top 1 percent is now wealthier than ever, while 
the real incomes of the middle and lower classes have stagnated or declined 
in recent decades (Davis 2012). Having undermined its own dynamism, 
capitalism is in crisis, yet many world business leaders argue that the wider 
economic malaise is an “abstraction” (Hutton 2013). Profits as a share of 
GDP in almost all Western countries have reportedly reached record highs, 
along with executive pay,9 while real wages for most people are stagnating, 
if not falling (ibid.).
As an indication of the magnitude of growing income inequalities, an 
IMF Working Paper released in January 2012 found that in the UK alone 
this could approximately explain the entire deterioration in the British 
current account deficit experienced between the early 1970s and 2007 (see 
Kumhof et al. 2012, 25).10 It also concluded that liberal financialization is 
empirically and theoretically associated with growing domestic and foreign 
indebtedness in most developed countries (ibid.). The message is clear: 
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there are inherent problems associated with neoliberal fiscal and economic 
policy and growing levels of income inequality and indebtedness—whether 
household, domestic, or foreign investment and consumption. Saez11 (2012), 
one of the leading US economists, estimates that in the United States during 
2010 the top 1 percent of incomes grew by 11.6 percent, while the bottom 
99 percent grew by only 0.2 percent. Hence, “the top 1 percent captured 
93 percent of the income” (ibid., 2).
A Crisis of Social Reproduction and Social Democracy
Financial crisis is but one aspect of the current global crisis. A second 
strong theme linking each of the articles is the crisis of social reproduction 
and social welfare. Brown et al. (2013) explore that issue in depth in their 
article “Careless Talk: Social Reproduction and Fault Lines of the Crisis 
in the UK.” This article makes an original contribution in the way it links 
the financial and economic crisis with the response of anti-austerity or anti-
cuts social movements to a crisis of care. Although focusing on events in 
the UK, the concept of a crisis of care has a broader reach, particularly in 
connecting the impact of the global financial and economic crisis to a crisis 
in social democracy.
The “crisis of care” is precipitated by the erosion of basic welfare 
provision as various governments introduce “austerity measures.” In the 
UK, the coalition government’s decision to increase most benefits by less 
than inflation marks a new low in the postwar history of welfare in the UK 
(Lansley 2013). This measure is unprecedented since World War II and 
represents a more punitive approach to welfare for those of working age 
(ibid.). This is hardly surprising since welfare provision in the UK—as in 
many other countries—today must undertake a role for which it was not 
originally designed. Its role as a safety net has greatly expanded due to 
the growing inability of the economic system to provide a basic threshold 
of living beyond which people should not fall, and to ensure welfare for 
all against the “five giant evils”—squalor, ignorance, want, idleness, and 
disease (Beveridge Report 1942).12
In the UK, the draconian cutbacks imposed by the Conservative-Liberal 
coalition government on public-sector spending as a result of the financial 
and economic crisis suggest that the “welfare system” is fast losing its 
fundamental purpose—to protect those most in need (Lansley 2013). This 
is evident in many European countries outside the UK, as well as in other 
countries across the world. As Brown et al. (2013) aptly conclude, the 
political and economic crisis that has developed out of the financial crisis 
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is also a crisis of social reproduction—a crisis in the ability of individuals 
and communities to reproduce their livelihoods.
This situation also represents a crisis in and of social democracy. It is a 
crisis for many social democratic parties—in Europe and elsewhere—since 
their decade-long strategy of full accommodation to neoliberalism to skim 
off the surplus for ameliorative social spending has collapsed (Guinan 
2013). More worrying, this crisis has not so far managed to unseat neoliberal 
orthodoxy as the dominant economic paradigm. This state of affairs has 
been exacerbated by a corresponding crisis of social democracy, namely 
low voter turnout at elections, political apathy, and evaporating trust in 
governments or traditional politics to address the questions that matter 
most to people (ibid.).
Political Crisis
Widespread protests and collective struggles, often organizationally diverse, 
diffuse, and confined to national boundaries, suggest a crisis of legitimation 
for (neo)liberal capitalism and its state apparatus (Habermas 1988, 36). 
Exacerbating this disenchantment and crisis of the state are widespread, 
angry perceptions by many people in Greece, Spain, Italy, the UK, Egypt, 
and beyond that their states are relatively weak, powerless, or reluctant to 
address the failures of the economic system or to correct a dysfunctional 
market mechanism (ibid.). Real political power, it seems, lies elsewhere 
and is not to be confused with the decision-making of the political or 
ruling elite.13 Indeed, the choices and actions of political elites these days 
are circumscribed by a combination of international and supranational 
institutions, financialization, and techno-managerial bureaucracies (see 
Davis 2012). This point is also raised and analyzed in greater depth in the 
article by Universidad Nomada (2013), “For a Democratic Revolution: 
Notes from the Universidad Nomada.”
Nowhere is this more obvious than in Portugal, which is experiencing 
the most severe upheaval since the 1974–1975 Revolution (Bergfeld 2012). 
The precarious position in Portugal is similar to that faced by the Greek 
populace, which became worse when in January 2013 the Greek parliament 
agreed to a further round of harsh spending cuts (see Malkoutzis 2013). 
Austerity measures such as these were conditions of the bailout imposed by 
the European troika. Over the past two years, the Portuguese, Italian, and 
Spanish governments experienced the same plight. These examples highlight 
the loss of national sovereignty and the way in which formal democratic 
processes within states are being undermined, if not completely eroded, 
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by intergovernmental and supranational institutions such as the European 
troika, which are not democratically accountable.
These aspects of political globalization have called into question 
theories of the “national public” as an imagined community that Anderson 
(2006) has associated with the development of the nation-state, as have 
the challenges posed by cultural globalization. Montagna’s (2013) article, 
“Labor, Citizenship, and Subjectivity: Migrant Struggles within the Italian 
Crisis,” provides a well-documented example of how in times of economic 
crisis and hardship a shared sense of the “national public” can take on its 
most insidious form: a growing nationalistic consciousness and politics. This 
article also provides an excellent analysis of how the recent financial and 
economic crisis has exacerbated the experience of migrant workers in Italy 
as a “reserve army of labor.” Closely associated with this is the nationalist 
view that casts migrant workers as “outsiders”—economically exploited, 
socially excluded, denied access to citizen rights and welfare, and subject 
to social racism and cultural discrimination.
Heightened nationalism, nationalistic politics, and socially exclusionary 
and racist government politics and policies are not unique to Italy or the 
Italian people. In Greece, the ultranationalist Golden Dawn party has come 
into prominence.14 Its members appear to be closely embedded within 
institutions of the Greek state, such as the police (Chatzistefanou 2012). 
Recent reports suggest close contact in Germany between German far-right 
groups and members of Golden Dawn in an attempt to strengthen their 
powerbase in Europe (Connolly and Smith 2013). Golden Dawn explains 
this on its website as the “answer of expat Greeks to the dirty hippies and 
the regime of democratic dictatorship in our homeland” (ibid.).
 In his article “The Crisis before ‘The Crisis’: Violence and 
Neoliberalization in Athens,” Dalakoglou (2013) details how the targeting of 
particular social groups is not confined to a nationalistic sense of “otherness.” 
In Greece, it includes both the national “other” (namely, migrants) and those 
deemed politically “deviant”—e.g., anarchists and far leftists. Moreover, 
this is closely associated with aggressive policing and tactics that target 
materially deprived districts in Athens where such “outcasts” are known 
to live.
Contentious Politics, Conflict, and Change
Each article in this issue is a testament to “contentious politics,”15 an 
interpretive framework that brings together three important areas of 
social life: contention, collective action, and politics. Leading scholars 
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recognize this approach as similar to, but distinctive from, the study of 
social movements (see Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 4; Tilly 2008; Tarrow 2006). 
Conceptually, contentious politics acknowledges that popular struggles take 
various forms and express themselves in different ways—for example, in 
terms of organization and mobilization—and occur outside the realm of 
mainstream politics. These variegated dimensions of extra-parliamentary 
protests and collective actions best capture the struggles and conflicts that 
have emerged in response to the global financial crisis of recent years. 
The examples in Spain, Greece, Italy, Egypt, the UK—and beyond—that 
I have selected exhibit novel and common aspects and features. They pose 
pertinent questions and suggest further scholarly attention.
In his article “The Impermanent Revolution: The Egyptian Revolutionary 
Movement in the Troubled Transition,” Gerbaudo (2013) provides an in-depth 
analysis of Egypt’s protracted and troubled period of transition since the 
Egyptian Revolution of January 2011. That transition is far from over. This 
provides a fascinating and thought-provoking perspective on “revolution” 
and political regimes and, as Gerbaudo points out, on “constituent power” 
and “constituted power” (Negri 2009). Whereas “constituent power” can 
be understood to open up revolutionary processes and the doors of change, 
the “constituted power” of the state acts quickly to close it down and bring 
it to order (Hardt 2009). Negri (2009) asks how we can ever have a new 
constituent power that is not reined in by the forces of the state. How does 
democracy “constitute” itself? In many respects, these questions capture 
the complexities and challenges of Egypt today, more than two years after 
the revolution of January 2011. They are questions that all democratic 
movements for change must consider.
Gerbaudo (2013) also highlights organizational and tactical considerations 
that are important for activists beyond Egypt. In the long period of transition 
during Egypt’s struggle to constitute democracy, the revolutionary movement 
of 2011 has become socially and politically polarized between two main 
actors: secular and nonsecular. Former allies during the revolutionary period, 
the progressive elements found themselves increasingly marginalized during 
the transitional period. In part, they were outmaneuvered by the strategic 
alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the army (SCAF); in part, they 
neglected the demands of their own social base. Finally, the organizational 
model of “leaderless resistance” that had served the movement well during 
the revolutionary period did not equip it properly in the postrevolutionary 
period to fulfill the constitutive need of revolutions to construct new 
democratic organizations and institutions.
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Leaderless resistance—also known as “horizontality” or “horizontalism”—
is the organizational practice that appears to have predominated in many of 
the radical protests that have emerged since 2004.16 According to Reyes et 
al. (2004), horizontal practice aspires
to an open relationship between participants, whose deliberative encounters 
(rather than representative status) form the basis of any decisions … [in 
contrast to “vertical” practices that] assume the existence and legitimacy 
of representative structures, in which bargaining power is accrued on the 
basis of an electoral mandate (or any other means of selection to which 
the members of an organization assent).
The power of horizontalism, it is argued, resides in its replicability 
for those who know nothing about theory and in its ability to break down 
hierarchies that seek to contain people (Mason 2012a). In other words, it 
rejects Weberian17 notions of vertical forms of power, authority, and decision-
making—the old organizing principles. Castells (2012, 225) argues that 
these principles are rejected not because of the lack of would-be leaders, 
but because of the deep distrust of the idea of political delegation in any 
form, which has its roots in the rejection of political representatives by the 
represented. For other commentators, however, the origins of this practice 
are more complex.
Mason (2012b, 80), for example, examines various social transformations 
within the past decade or so that changed people’s behavior, consumption 
habits, and their consciousness in the form of attitudes toward hierarchies and 
property. Others like Sennett (2006) point to the “new culture of capitalism” 
in which the fragmentation of big institutions like health and education has 
left many people’s lives in a fragmented, precarious state. The goal is the 
same, since political and economic rulers and leaders now seek to dismantle 
rigid bureaucracies (ibid., 2). Ironically, the horizontal practice of many 
contemporary activists reflects tendencies within Western societies toward 
dismantling or rejecting large bureaucratic apparatuses, in favor of a more 
flexible, horizontal way of working and organizing. However, the latter is 
not leaderless and this way of working may serve different purposes.
For radical activists, this relatively new practice of leaderless resistance is 
a mode of “doing,” although it can often appear as if it is a way of “being”; 
notably, it is a part of identity formation within particular cultures of protest 
(Reyes et al. 2004). During the past decade, social and cultural factors such 
as new technological and electronic networks of media and communication 
may or may not have influenced the emergent cultures of protest. The same 
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is true for the “rhizomatic” character of a “networked society,” on- and 
offline, for the changing structure of employment and work, and for a future 
in which many can expect no real economic prospects or even a promise 
of change in the near term.18
Leaderless resistance as a nonhierarchical form of acting and organizing 
is also tactical in the sense of making quick dissolution and change possible 
when needed or desirable. It is flexible and moveable in its organizational 
structure and form. Of the movements outlined in this special issue, 
horizontalist tactics appear to be an organizational feature for mobilizing 
different collective struggles, reflected in the use of new media technology 
as a resource in communicating with and mobilizing people and in the 
organizational form adopted when groups come together in urban spaces 
of action and deliberation. Horizontalism is thus a resource or tool used 
to mobilize people—e.g., various social media—and part of the structure 
of political opportunity that is able to bring people together from a virtual 
sphere to an urban space (see Castells 2012; Mason 2012a,b; Alexander 
2011; Gerbaudo 2012; Gelvin, 2012).
The role of media, particularly new media, warrants attention since the 
world in which we live has become radically interconnected, interdependent, 
and is communicated through flows of information (Cottle 2011, ix). In 
this global age of information, crises of any nature are not confined to 
national boundaries; they can be communicated and understood across 
national territories and surrounding regions, and beyond. Transnational 
media communication also provides the political opportunity for global 
reporting on collective struggles, conflicts, and crises. As a result, collective 
protests and demonstrations have increasingly sought to highlight issues 
of global scope and transnational concern through the mass media (Cottle 
and Lester 2011).
Two well-known scholars of social movements remind us that collective 
protests and struggles often instantiate wider global forces of change, even 
when locally enacted or directed at national institutions and governments 
(see Della Porta and Tarrow 2004; Tarrow 2006). In other words, the 
transnational media may have rhizomatic potential as a tool for raising 
awareness of issues or gaining support for a cause, as well as a means of 
encouraging wider collective struggles throughout the world.
Another common feature of recent protests and struggles is that although 
they were often transnationally communicated through various media forms, 
they generally were not transnationally organized. That is true even of the 
Occupy movement, which was rhizomatic in the way it developed. Other 
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collective struggles such as the Egyptian revolutionary movement, Italian 
migrants’ uprisings, UKUncut, and the Indignados were more nationally 
focused, although they may have spawned similar groups in other countries. 
In short, such collective struggles and conflicts were communicated and 
mediated transnationally, but were not necessarily transnationally coordinated 
in their organizational, tactical, or strategic aims and agendas.
Various social actors have been active within the global struggles and 
conflicts that emerged after the onset of the financial crisis. Mason (2012b, 66) 
suggests that at the center of all the protest movements is a new sociological 
type, the graduate with no future. Although not without substance, this is a 
vast overgeneralization. Neither the struggles of migrant workers in Italy 
of Greece nor the revolutionary movement in Egypt can be reduced to this 
new sociological type.
Young people, whether graduates or not, have played a key role in recent 
struggles. I suspect they were not at the center of all of them. The young are the 
essence of the “laptop generation” and have the technological and multimedia 
skills that have so often been central to communicating information and 
mobilizing people. In so doing, they connected the autonomous virtual 
sphere with autonomous urban spaces of action and deliberative practice.
It is difficult to discern a single sociological type for the actors in the 
recent social conflicts and struggles. They range from migrants to old-style 
labor activists, radicals, the elderly, the disaffected, the socially excluded, 
“outcasts,” middle-class professionals, the working class, the unemployed, 
youth, and more. The global crisis is a manifestly social and humanitarian 
crisis and the diversity of the actors involved simply indicates the scale 
and global reach of the crisis and the enormous range of people affected.
The “repertoires of action” have been equally diverse. In most cases, the 
social media and the new media technology have been central to getting the 
message out. We also find a mix of classic and new modes, ranging from sit-
ins, demonstrations, marches, and nonviolent protests to imaginative cultural 
and symbolic forms of protest such as urban graffiti, “performativity,” art, 
slogans, and horizontalism.19
The policing of protest deserves comment because when the state is 
under threat and its legitimacy is at stake, the institutions and forces of 
control react with increasing brutality and violence. Gerbaudo (2013) and 
Dalakoglou (2013) capture well this phenomenon, which was apparent in 
the heavy policing tactics of the NYPD when evicting Occupy protestors 
from Zuccotti Park in New York in 2011 (CNN 2011), in the G20 protests in 
London in April 2009 (Meikle et al. 2009), and more recently in the police 
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violence reported during the first anniversary of the Spanish Indignados 
movement in Madrid (Tremlett 2012).
The policing of protest has become more violent and has embraced new 
tactics, including the use of “kettling,”20 water cannons, teargas, rubber 
bullets, and the classic instruments of violence—batons, beatings, strippings, 
and brute physical force. Little has been written about the ways in which 
protest is being controlled or how this has changed in recent years.
Summary
In this issue, global crisis and conflict have been explored with reference to 
the 2008 financial crisis and to the nexus between the collective struggles that 
emerged in response to the crisis of capitalism and its human consequences. 
Framing each article is the wider political-economic context within which 
such conflict has occurred: the crisis of neoliberalism, the legitimation 
crisis of national states, the crisis of welfare provision and democracy, 
and the corresponding crisis of representative politics. Considering the 
interconnectedness of the global crisis and the conflicts of recent years, 
what hope is there for the future?
It is reassuring that at least one leading member of the Bank of England 
credits Occupy with having got it “right” in popularizing the problems of the 
financial system and in pointing to the growing inequities in the allocation 
of wealth and incomes globally (Haldane 2012; McCarthy 2012).21 Haldane 
(2012) is not speaking simply in moral terms; he believes that Occupy 
has influenced policy by seeking to close the “fault lines” in the global 
financial system. If this is more than rhetorical posturing, perhaps collective 
struggles and conflicts can and do offer the hope of change. As such, these 
struggles go beyond fighting for power—political power. Alternative forms 
of counterpower, whether symbolic, cultural, or political, facilitate change 
and represent power in movement—to paraphrase Tarrow (2011).
Social democracy may be at an impasse, but history and change seem to 
be in the air. As Stiglitz, Schiffrin, and Kircher-Allen (2012) note, from Cairo 
to Wall Street there has been a “global spring.” History is on the march. The 
social crisis that has unfolded alongside the economic and political crisis 
has enabled people to ask more pertinent and penetrating questions about 
the need for fundamental, systemic change. But what would this look like 
and what would it entail?
The myriad global protests and struggles since 2008 offer hope for the 
future in creating a public space for debate. There is the potential to challenge 
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and change established values, morality, and the politics associated with a 
corrupt and dying capitalist system and its neoliberal orthodoxy and fault 
lines. Creating such a public space is important for opening up a wider 
debate over viable alternatives. These opportunities also remind us that we 
are not witnessing “the end of ideology,” but rather its reawakening. Each 
article in this special issue is a testament to this.
NOTES
1. Bauman (2011) uses this term in reference to social inequalities and human suffering 
in a global age.
2. See the following at BBC Online: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21002912.
3. Lansley (2013) argues that the decision by the coalition government to increase 
benefits by less than inflation is unprecedented for the post-1945 period in the UK and marks 
“an all-time low” and a more punitive approach to welfare for those of working age.
4. The European “troika” includes the European Union (EU), European Central Bank 
(ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
5. The film Inside Job (2008) offers a comprehensive analysis of the global financial 
crisis. Directed by Charles Ferguson, the film includes extensive interviews with key financial 
insiders, politicians, and academics.
6. AIG reportedly received a $58 billion dollar credit facility from the US Federal 
Reserve Bank on September 16, 2008, to enable the company to meet increased collateral 
obligations consequent to the credit rating downgrade. This was in exchange for the issuance 
of a stock warrant to the Federal Reserve Bank for 79.9 percent of AIG’s equity. See http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AIG.
7. Lapavitsas et al. (2012, 1) note that political economists have extensively discussed 
financialization and cite van Treeck (2009), Lapavitsas (2009), and Dos Santos (2009) as 
useful resources.
8. For a fuller discussion of institutional bias and malfunctions within the Eurozone, 
its peripheral economies, and the role of finance, see Lapavitsas et al. (2012), Chapter 1.
9. Goldman Sachs, for example, has deferred paying bonuses to staff into the next 
financial year so that they can enjoy the lower tax rate (Hutton 2013).
10. The views expressed in the Working Paper are those of the authors and should not 
be reported or referred to as representing the views of the International Monetary Fund.
11. Saez is professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley.
12. Beveridge’s plans for the welfare state were premised on a commitment to full 
employment and decent wage levels to limit the role played by welfare.
13. The distinction here is between the formal political elite and actual political power.
14. Golden Dawn holds nearly 20 seats in the Greek parliament.
15. Tilly and Tarrow (2007, 4) first used this term to refer to “interactions in which 
actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interest, in which governments appear either 
as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties.” See also Tilly (2008).
16. Notably, that began with the anti-globalization European Social Forum in London, 
2004 (see Reyes et al. 2004).
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17. This is a reference to the work of sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920). Weber’s 
work on bureaucracy established hierarchical practice as the most efficient way of 
organizing and as a key process in the rationalization of Western society.
18. Rhizomatic is a concept coined by Deleuze and Guattari and used by Castells 
(2012, 147) to refer to networks of communication in the Internet age. The term derives 
from botany and refers to a plant that characteristically has subterranean roots, is horizontal 
in form, and is able to grow shoots and roots from its nodes. If a rhizome is broken into 
pieces, it is able to replace itself with a new plant.
19. For example, Occupy activists wore Guy Fawkes masks, flowers have been handed 
out, and public urban spaces have been occupied.
20. Also referred to as “containment” or “corralling,” police use this control tactic in 
large-scale protests.
21. Alan Haldane is the leading expert from the Bank of England on financial stability.
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